In this paper, the theory and practice of therapeutic touch (TT) is scrutinized from a number of perspectives. Firstly, the alleged close relationship between TT and Martha Rogers’ Science of Unitary Human Beings is evaluated. Secondly, the employment of the language of modern physics in Rogers’ theory and TT is critically examined. The authors then review the research literature on TT's efficacy, completing their critique by discussing the ethical issues involved in the practice of TT. As each of the perspectives (...) considered reveals some concerns, the paper concludes that TT is a questionable intervention, underpinned by a very weak theoretical, clinical and research base. (shrink)

Into those things from which existing things have their coming into being, their passing away, too, takes place, according to what must be; for they make reparation to one another for their injustice according to the ordinance of time . . . . (Anaximander fragment; Simplicius Phys., 24, 18 [DK 12 B 1]; trans. Robinson, EGP, 34)[T]o remember and to bear witness to something that is constitutively forgotten, not only in each individual mind, but in the very thought of (...) the West. (Lyotard, “HJ,” 141)To bear witness to the differend. (Lyotard, DPD, xiii)[I]n witnessing, one also exterminates. (I, 204)Reality is composed of the différend. (shrink)

In a passage in A Theory of Justice, which has become increasingly influential in recent years, John Rawls (1971) noted an analogy between moral phi- losophy and grammar. Moral philosophy, or at least the first stage of moral philosophy, Rawls maintained, can be thought of as the attempt to describe our moral capacity – the capacity which underlies “the poten- tially infinite number and variety of [moral] judgments we are prepared..

Stephen Davies taught philosophy at the University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand. His research specialty is the philosophy of art. He is a former President of the American Society for Aesthetics. His books include Definitions of Art (Cornell UP, 1991), Musical Meaning and Expression (Cornell UP, 1994), Musical Works and Performances (Clarendon, 2001), Themes in the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2003), Philosophical Perspectives on Art (OUP, 2007), Musical Understandings and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music (OUP, 2011), The (...) Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution (OUP, 2012), The Philosophy of Art (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016 second ed.), and Adornment: What Self-decorations Tells Us about Who We Are, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020). (shrink)

Hegel, Derrida, and Restricted Economy: The Case of Mechanical Memory STEPHEN HOULGA'FE A GLANCE AT THE TEXTS OF Jacques Derrida and at the texts and lectures of G. W. F. Hegel indicates that Hegel and Derrida are extraordi- narily different thinkers. Hegel is clearly what Derrida would regard as a philosopher of presence, working toward the point "where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself," where con- sciousness is present to itself as it is (...) in itself. 1 Derrida, on the other hand, suggests that everything that is present, here, now, at this moment, bears within it, as constitutive features of itself, the marks or traces of what is irredeemably past, and that, consequently, we can never talk of entities such as ourselves being simply or wholly present to themselves. ~ Derrida claims in Positions that he tries hard to distinguish "diff6rance" from tlegelian "differ- ence," indeed that "diff~rance" might well be defined precisely as "the inter- ruption, the destruction of Hegelian sublation [relive] wherever it operates"; and, to judge at least from the look of his texts, he would seem to have G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwamag B~inden, edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols. and Index , Ill [Phi~nomenologie des Geistes], 74. For the English translation, see Hegel, Phenomenolog) of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller, with analysis of the.. (shrink)

Hegel, Derrida, and Restricted Economy: The Case of Mechanical Memory STEPHEN HOULGA'FE A GLANCE AT THE TEXTS OF Jacques Derrida and at the texts and lectures of G. W. F. Hegel indicates that Hegel and Derrida are extraordi- narily different thinkers. Hegel is clearly what Derrida would regard as a philosopher of presence, working toward the point "where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself," where con- sciousness is present to itself as it is (...) in itself. 1 Derrida, on the other hand, suggests that everything that is present, here, now, at this moment, bears within it, as constitutive features of itself, the marks or traces of what is irredeemably past, and that, consequently, we can never talk of entities such as ourselves being simply or wholly present to themselves. ~ Derrida claims in Positions that he tries hard to distinguish "diff6rance" from tlegelian "differ- ence," indeed that "diff~rance" might well be defined precisely as "the inter- ruption, the destruction of Hegelian sublation [relive] wherever it operates"; and, to judge at least from the look of his texts, he would seem to have G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwamag B~inden, edited by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols. and Index, Ill [Phi~nomenologie des Geistes], 74. For the English translation, see Hegel, Phenomenolog) of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller, with analysis of the... (shrink)

Experimental philosophy is often regarded as a category mistake. Even those who reject that view typically see it as irrelevant to standard philosophical projects. We argue that neither of these claims can be sustained and illustrate our view with a sketch of the rich interconnections with philosophy of science.Keywords: Science; Philosophy; Experimental Philosophy.

Charles Ellwood is usually described as a junior member of the founding generation of American Sociology. Ellwood fulfils many of the standard stereotypes of the American sociology student of the era. He was born on a farm and, after winning a state scholarship, went to Cornell, as he himself noted, ‘because it was virtually the state university of New York’.1 He then went directly on to the University of Chicago, where he was converted only partially from his concerns with social (...) problems to a theorist. He was one of the first PhDs in sociology from the University, and the first Chicago Sociology PhD to hold a position in sociology at a major university other than Chicago itself: a large land grant university in the Midwest, Missouri. He stayed there for most of his career until leaving for Duke, an institution with a strong religious orientation that prized him for his religious writings. (shrink)

The development of electronic personal health records by independent vendors and national health systems is understood to empower patients and create a new kind of consumerism in healthcare. With more personal health information at hand, active participation in the management of health and rational purchasing of healthcare services will be possible. Healthcare systems will also be able to contain costs and achieve sustainability. Based on a careful examination of the literature, we argue that many of the declared benefits of this (...) technology are rather unattainable. As the boundaries between the public and private healthcare sectors become blurred and as employers struggle to reduce health insurance expenses, this proclaimed ‘consumer empowerment in healthcare’ is an attempt to introduce a technology and a business model for centralising all relevant PHI to render them economic. We reflect on the consequences for the ‘empowered’ user and we suggest that this new market device has to separate and individually address sufficiently issues of privacy, confidentiality and security before it can claim a place in the digital healthcare ecosystem. (shrink)

[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces (...) of nonliterality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology. /// [Andre Gallois] I discuss Steve Yablo's defence of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. In the first section I set out what I take that distinction, as Carnap draws it, to be, and spell out a central motivation Carnap has for invoking it. In the second section I endorse, and augment, Yablo's response to Quine's arguments against Carnap. In the third section I say why Carnap's application of the distinction between internal and external questions runs into trouble. In the fourth section I spell out what I take to be Yablo's version of Carnap. In the last I say why that version is especially vulnerable to the objection raised in the second. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Beschäftigung mit der ethischen Dimension des ärztlichen Handelns beruht auf der freiwilligen Einsicht in deren Notwendigkeit. Es stellte sich die Frage, ob die Anwesenheit von Studierenden, die nur durch den Zwang des Stundenplans Ethikseminare besuchen, die Qualität der Veranstaltungen messbar negativ beeinflusst. In einer über 2 Jahre umfassenden Umfrage zu Lernzielen, Unterrichtsatmosphäre, Moderation und Fächerwichtigkeiten wurden die Ethikseminare an der Universität Ulm evaluiert. Hierzu bekamen wir Fragebögen von 192 freiwillig Teilnehmenden des Jahrgangs 2001/2002 und von 293 Pflichtteilnehmern des Jahrgangs (...) 2002/2003 zurück. Überraschenderweise gab es bei keiner relevanten Frage oder Bewertung einen statistisch signifikanten Unterschied zwischen freiwilligen und Pflichtteilnehmern. Zum Teil deutliche Unterschiede zeigten sich zwischen männlichen und weiblichen Studierenden. Diese Unterschiede müssen aufgrund ihrer didaktischen und konzeptionellen Bedeutung weiterverfolgt werden. Das Umfrageergebnis lässt hoffen, dass das Unterrichtskonzept der fallorientierten Kleingruppenseminare die Lernziele bei allen Studierenden verwirklichen kann. (shrink)

Patientenselbstbestimmung und Patientenverfügungen haben zunehmende Bedeutung und Beachtung erfahren. In der vorliegenden qualitativen Studie wurden 15 Patientinnen und Patienten mit amyotropher Lateralsklerose —einer unheilbaren, chronisch-degenerativen Erkrankung mit vorhersehbarer Symptomatik—interviewt, um zu erfahren, welche Werte und Kriterien sie bei prospektiven Entscheidungen am Lebensende und bei der Abfassung von PV zugrunde legen. Die Auswertung erfolgte nach der Methode der „grounded theory“. Die befragten Patientinnen und Patienten befürworteten einen Verzicht auf lebenserhaltende Behandlungen, wenn sie keine hinreichenden Lebensmöglichkeiten mehr sahen, d. h. wenn sie (...) die aktuelle Lebensqualität für unzureichend erachteten und die Chance auf Besserung als gering einschätzten. Dem Patientenwillen sprachen sie bei der Entscheidungsfindung ein Vetorecht zu. Patientenverfügungen fassten sie erst ab, als sie keine Hoffnung mehr auf Besserung ihrer Erkrankung hatten. Sie verstanden diese als Instrumente zur vorsorglichen Erklärung ihres Wunsches, auf lebensverlängernde Maßnahmen zu verzichten, wenn die LM inakzeptabel geworden sind. Damit wollten sie sich gegenüber dem Arzt absichern, den sie in der Rolle eines Anwalts des Lebens sahen und mit dem sie daher ihre Behandlungswünsche nicht besprochen haben. Trotz vorhersehbarer Symptomatik legten sie in ihren PV keine spezifischen Behandlungswünsche nieder, sondern verwendeten allgemeine Formularmuster ohne konkreten Bezug zu ihrer Erkrankung. Daher bestehen auch bei dieser Patientengruppe Zweifel, ob die PV in einer konkreten Behandlungssituation hilfreich sind. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer heutige Arbeitsalltag im medizinischen Betrieb ist durch verschiedene Belastungsfaktoren gekennzeichnet: 1) die Tempobeschleunigung und die Komplexitätssteigerung der medizinischen Entwicklung allgemein sowie 2) eine zunehmende moralische Verunsicherung des Personals in Bezug auf das Verhältnis von Möglichkeiten und Notwendigkeiten bestimmter therapeutischer Verfahren. Die in diesem Aufsatz vorgelegten Beobachtungen, die aus einem Projekt am Lehrstuhl für Ethik der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen resultieren, machen noch einen weiteren Punkt geltend, so dass 3) bereits die unterschiedliche Einschätzung rein sachlicher Fragen zu einem Dissens führen kann, der (...) als moralischer empfunden wird. Aus diesen drei Momenten erwächst ein allgemeiner Bedarf an ethischer Handlungsorientierung. Allerdings ist die Entlastung, die durch ethische Kommunikation, beispielsweise in klinischen Ethik-Komitees, erreicht wird, anderer Art als zunächst in der Regel erwartet. Denn die Leistung liegt nicht so sehr in der Lösung von Problemen als vielmehr in deren Beschreibung. (shrink)

Die Einführung der kostenkalkulierten und landesweit einheitlich bepreisten DRGs hat die Möglichkeiten gewinnorientierter Krankenhausträger, ehemals kommunale, defizitäre Krankenhäuser in die Gewinnzone zu führen, erschwert. Diese reagieren darauf mit dem Einsatz bisher nicht gekannter Werkzeuge wie beispielsweise der Steuerung von Patientenströmen, Anreizsystemen, Gründung von Privatkliniken sowie erlösorientierten Therapien und Abrechnungen. Mittlerweile bedienen sich auch andere Trägergruppen dieser Instrumente, so dass sich die Frage stellt, ob angesichts der Wettbewerbssituation nicht gewinnorientierte Träger eines besonderen wirtschaftlichen Schutzes bedürfen, damit die bisher im Krankenhaus gültigen (...) ethischen Prinzipien auch weiterhin Anwendung finden können. (shrink)

This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the (...) possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections. (shrink)

This article develops a conceptual framework of the dynamics of trust between parents and professionals in early childhood education and care. In contemporary Western society, the heightened risk awareness with respect to early childhood has led to an increased focus on the collaboration between home and daycare. Mutual trust is a core aspect of this collaboration, resulting in a trust imperative. Drawing on Knud Eilar Løgstrup, Noomi Matthiesen, Paula Cavada-Hrepich, and Lene Tanggaard argue here that trust is a spontaneous, (...) relational phenomenon rooted in practice and emerging in a normatively structured order. They develop a conceptual framework of trust that has two dimensions: a basic dimension and a competence dimension. The basic dimension is connected to the willingness of the other to do what is good and right according to the normative order, while the competence dimension has to do with the ability to do so. The authors contend that, while trust is a spontaneous and sovereign phenomenon outside of individuals' control, parents and professionals in daycare perform in ways that are recognized as more or less trust-worthy. They also perform in ways that signal they are trust-ful. However, these conscious performances can paradoxically reduce the possibility of spontaneous trust. (shrink)

Names, descriptions, and demonstratives raise well-known logical, ontological, and epistemological problems. Perhaps less well known, amongst philosophers at least, are the ways in which some of these problems not only recur with pronouns but also cross-cut further problems exposed by the study in generative linguistics of morpho-syntactic constraints on interpretation. These problems will be my primary concern here, but I want to address them within a general picture of interpretation that is required if wires are not to be crossed. That (...) picture will be sketched in sections 3 and 4; subsequent sections will focus on pronouns and binding, drawing heavily on what has preceded. (shrink)

Postmodernism has evoked great controversy and it continues to do so today, as it disseminates into general discourse. Some see its principles, such as its fundamental resistance to metanarratives, as frighteningly disruptive, while a growing number are reaping the benefits of its innovative perspective. In Political Theory and Postmodernism, Stephen K. White outlines a path through the postmodern problematic by distinguishing two distinct ways of thinking about the meaning of responsibility, one prevalent in modern and the other in postmodern (...) perspectives. Using this as a guide, White explores the work of Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Habermas, as well as 'difference' feminists, with the goal of showing how postmodernism can inform contemporary ethical-political reflection. In his concluding chapter, White examines how this revisioned postmodern perspective might bear on our thinking about justice. (shrink)

Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say that the (...) second threat relies on a perversion of proportionality that would lay waste to all causal relations. (shrink)

Despite holding that all concepts are strictly speaking innate, Leibniz attempts to accommodate the common belief that at least some concepts are adventitious by appealing to his theory of ideal action. The essential idea is that an innate concept can be considered adventitious, in a sense, just in case its ideal cause is to be found outside the mind of the one who possesses the concept. I explore this attempt at accommodation and argue that it fails. [See external link for (...) English draft.]. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of right concerns ideas on justice, moral responsibility, family life, economic activity and the political structure of the state. He shows how human freedom involves living with others in accordance with publicly recognized rights and laws.

From the school yard to the workplace, there’s no charge more damning than “you’re being unfair!” Born out of democracy and raised in open markets, fairness has become our de facto modern creed. The very symbol of American ethics—Lady Justice—wears a blindfold as she weighs the law on her impartial scale. In our zealous pursuit of fairness, we have banished our urges to like one person more than another, one thing over another, hiding them away as dirty secrets of our (...) humanity. In Against Fairness, polymath philosopher Stephen T. Asma drags them triumphantly back into the light. Through playful, witty, but always serious arguments and examples, he vindicates our unspoken and undeniable instinct to favor, making the case that we would all be better off if we showed our unfair tendencies a little more kindness—indeed, if we favored favoritism. Conscious of the egalitarian feathers his argument is sure to ruffle, Asma makes his point by synthesizing a startling array of scientific findings, historical philosophies, cultural practices, analytic arguments, and a variety of personal and literary narratives to give a remarkably nuanced and thorough understanding of how fairness and favoritism fit within our moral architecture. Examining everything from the survival-enhancing biochemistry that makes our mothers love us to the motivating properties of our “affective community,” he not only shows how we favor but the reasons we should. Drawing on thinkers from Confucius to Tocqueville to Nietzsche, he reveals how we have confused fairness with more noble traits, like compassion and open-mindedness. He dismantles a number of seemingly egalitarian pursuits, from classwide Valentine’s Day cards to civil rights, to reveal the envy that lies at their hearts, going on to prove that we can still be kind to strangers, have no prejudice, and fight for equal opportunity at the same time we reserve the best of what we can offer for those dearest to us. Fed up with the blue-ribbons-for-all absurdity of "fairness" today, and wary of the psychological paralysis it creates, Asma resets our moral compass with favoritism as its lodestar, providing a strikingly new and remarkably positive way to think through all our actions, big and small. (shrink)

Global Media Ethics is the first comprehensive cross-cultural exploration of the conceptual and practical issues facing media ethics in a global world. A team of leading journalism experts investigate the impact of major global trends on responsible journalism. The first full-length, truly global textbook on media ethics; Explores how current global changes in media promote and inhibit responsible journalism; Includes relevant and timely ethical discussions based on major trends in journalism and global media; Questions existing frameworks in media ethics in (...) light of the impact of global media; Contributors are leading experts in global journalism and communication. (shrink)

Historical introduction -- Human being -- Identity and human incompletion in Sartre -- Identity and human incompletion in Aquinas -- Human understanding -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Sartre -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Aquinas -- Human freedom -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Sartre -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Aquinas -- Human fulfillment -- The possibility of human happiness in Sartre -- The possibility of human happiness in (...) Aquinas. (shrink)

Bradwardine’s solution to the the logical paradoxes depends on the idea that every sentence signifies many things, and its truth depends on things’ being wholly as it signifies. This idea is underpinned by his claim that a sentence signifies everything that follows from what it signifies. But the idea that signification is closed under entailment appears too strong, just as logical omniscience is unacceptable in the logic of knowledge. What is needed is a more restricted closure principle. A clue can (...) be found in speech act pluralism, whereby indirect speech reports are closed under intersubstitutivity of co-referential terms. The conclusion is that solving the semantic paradoxes does not require revision of logic, thus saving logic from paradox. (shrink)

A description and analysis of attitudes to non-human animals in classical and late antique Mediterranean thought.

I examine the (mediated) correspondence between Spinoza and Robert Boyle concerning the latter’s account of fluidity and his experiments on reconstitution of niter in the light of the epistemology and doctrine of method contained in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. I argue that both the Treatise and the correspondence reveal that for Spinoza, the proper method of science is not experimental, and that he accepted a powerful under-determination thesis. I argue that, in contrast to modern versions, Spinoza’s (...) form of naturalism was a highly rationalist and anti-empirical one. I conclude with a brief account of the value of experience and experimentation for Spinoza’s scientific method. (shrink)

This book is a record of my dialogues with Stephen Hawking, his graduate assistants and his nurses during a four city public lecture tour I organized for Hawking, including Portland, Eugene, Seattle, Vancouver, BC. We discussed 20th century science and philosophy of science. Since I was often the one being questioned, much of the contents reflect my PhD research at the University of London. My focus was on understanding the limits of science, as represented by quantum theory and relativity. (...) My mentors had been Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos, and I was strongly influenced by Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. In one in depth presentation to Hawking I suggested that Newtonian space-time and Maxwellian space-time were complementary, were defined by complementary symmetry principles. I had opportunity to present the same arguments to Kip Thorne and Freeman Dyson. Hawking simply remarked that I 'may be right'. Thorne confirmed that practitioners of General Relativity use both depending on the problem at hand. Dyson was emphatic – "Yes. Definitely. Absolutely.". (shrink)